Final Submission by Peter Bonsall to Public Inquiry on Leeds Trolleybus by Bonsall, P
This is a repository copy of Final Submission by Peter Bonsall to Public Inquiry on Leeds 
Trolleybus.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/141583/
Version: Published Version
Other:
Bonsall, P (2014) Final Submission by Peter Bonsall to Public Inquiry on Leeds Trolleybus.
North West Leeds Transport Forum. 
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
30/09/14  OBJ/1719 
My name is Peter Bonsall, I am Professor Emeritus of Transport Planning at the University of 
Leeds and I am presenting expert evidence on behalf of the NWLTF.  
 
My original Proof (OBJ1719 NWLTF-3) is supplemented by ŵǇƌĞďƵƚƚĂůŽĨƚŚĞWƌŽƉŽƐĞƌ ?ƐWƌŽŽĨƐ
and by NWLTF122 ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐŵǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞWƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƌĞďƵƚƚĂůŽĨŵǇƉƌŽŽĨĂŶĚƚŽ
additional information which came to light during the Inquiry, together with errata for my proof 
(to which I must add errata for NWLTF122:  
- ŽŶƉĂŐĞ ? ?ĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? PƌĞƉůĂĐĞĨŝŶĂůƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ “/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ďǇ “,ŽǁĞǀĞƌdĂďůĞ ? ?ŽĨ-
1-8 shows that the person hours are higher in the NGT scenario than in the Do Minimum scenario 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞĚĂǇ ? ? 
- on page 48: where the 4th ůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞƉĂƌĂŐƌĂƉŚďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ “WW ? ? ? ?  ƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĂĚ “ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶ
ŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚƌĂǀĞůůĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂŵƉĞĂŬŚŽƵƌ ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ “ĨĂůůŝŶŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚƌĂǀĞůůĞĚ ? 
- ŽŶƉĂŐĞ ? ? PǁŚĞƌĞůŝŶĞ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞĂĚ “, ? ?ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ “'-4- ? ? ? ? ?) 
 
I will now summarise my relevant experience and expertise and explain how I became involved 
with NWLTF.  
 
A. Experience and  background   
 
1. Curriculum Vitae (section A of NWLTF122) 
 
40 years experience in transport analysis and planning including spells in the private sector and 
on secondment to local government.  
My particular specialism has been in the analysis and modelling of traveller behaviour and in the 
assessment of transport policy interventions. 
 
Have worked as a consultant /advisor to: 
x The Department of Transport  W most recently on the potential use of new technologies to 
replace or enhance the National Travel Survey 
x The Highways Agency  W most recently on the evaluation and modelling of their Smart 
Motorways Program 
x The Department of Trade and Industry - on E-commerce  
x Dept of Energy & Climate Change with Dept of Business, Innovation & Skills - on the market 
for Electric Cars 
x The Cabinet Office on issues of Social Equity in Transport Policy 
x Overseas Governments - most recently the Dutch Rikswaterstadt on issues in the 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞǁĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚǀĂůƵĞŽĨdƌĂǀĞůůĞƌƐ ?dŝŵĞ 
x >ŽĐĂůŽƵŶĐŝůƐŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ?ŵŽƐƚƌĞĐĞŶƚůǇ ?ĂŶĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ>ŝǀĞƌƉŽŽů ?ƐŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨtheir 
City Centre Traffic management proposals. 
 
I have been called to give evidence on a number of Inquiries and Audits including: 
x dŚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŽĨdƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ ?Ɛ^ƚĂŶĚŝŶŐĚǀŝƐŽƌǇŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŽŶdƌƵŶŬZŽĂĚƉƉƌĂŝƐĂů 
(SACTRA) on the question of the extent to which new roads generate traffic  
x A House of Commons Select Committee to which I gave evidence on Planning Gain 
x A House of Lords Select Committee investigation on the effectiveness of a range of methods 
of influencing  behaviour - where my evidence was on the relative effectiveness of pricing 
ĂŶĚ “ĞǆŚŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƚƌĂǀĞůůĞƌďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ. 
x dŚĞh^dƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽĂƌĚ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƋƵŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶdƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚ
Financing 
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I have worked closely with a number of consultancy companies on a range of projects  W my role 
usually being to advise on the design of surveys, the suitability of models and the interpretation 
of results. I have led research teams on numerous research projects including, most recently, a 
European Union funded investigation of transport connectivity and integration. 
 
I have published over 200 papers, books, chapters and reports on wide range of transport topics  W 
the most recent being a book chapter reviewing methods of achieving modal shift. I have 
specified and programmed a number of Transport Models including models of mode choice and 
route choice and a strategic planning model which encapsulates the relationship between 
transport and land use and which is in use as a basic training aid in transport planning courses 
around the world. 
 
I am a former Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Transport and its successor the Chartered 
Institute of Logistics and Transport and was, until recently, co-editor of the Journal of Transport 
Policy. 
 
I had, for many years, a central role in teaching at the Institute for Transport Studies - ITS - and 
was its Director of Studies from 1996 to 2000. I led courses on Transport Planning and Modelling, 
Public Transport Planning and on Transport Planning Forecasting and Analysis. A version of this 
course was developed for mid-career officials in The Department for Transport and has been 
delivered to several cohorts of DfT staff. 
 
2. How I became involved as expert advisor to NWLTF 
i. I was involved in DĞƚƌŽ ?Ɛstrategy discussions some years ago and was among the 77% who, in 
2009, expressed support for the concept of a network of BRT routes. I supported the original 
Southern and Eastern Routes and the idea of a city centre loop but had serious doubts about 
its appropriateness for the A660 Corridor and about the use of trolleybus technology  - I think I 
annotated my questionnaire to that effect.  
ii. My overall view at that time was that the project was unlikely to get DfT funding and I was 
surprised when, following intensive lobbying, the NGT project came alive again. 
iii. When I first looked at the PEBC in early autumn 2012, I was initially impressed by BCR and 
apparent attention to detail.  But was surprised at the poor performance of the alternative 
solutions and could not at first understand what was causing that. It was only after delving 
into the more detailed reports and documents that the reasons became apparent and I 
became alarmed at the lack of balance in the case which had been presented to DfT, to the 
local politicians and to the public.   
iv. It was at about this time (autumn 2012) that a number of people, knowing of my involvement 
in transport policy issues, asked me to help them understand the NGT proposal. When the 
NWLTF was formed, I was asked to attend its regular meetings as a co-opted member.  
v. I have studied many, but by no means all, ƚŚĞWƌŽƉŽƐĞƌƐ ?ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?I have concentrated my 
attention on the transport analyses which underlie the Business Case. Close examination of 
the documentation has often raised additional questions which required information not 
apparent in the original documentation. As a general rule, I have found that the closer my 
examination of the material, the more reason I find to be concerned about the quality of the 
analysis and about ƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƌesults. 
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I will now turn to the substance of my evidence. 
dŚĞWƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƌĞďƵƚƚĂůŽĨŵǇWƌŽŽĨ ?Z ?-OBJ1719) sought to rebut some, but not all, of the 
points in my original Proof. My response to that rebuttal (NWLTF122 sections B1-B139) concedes 
that I had misinterpreted four numbers in their data (See NWLTF122 sections B54, B60 & B81), 
but argues that the remainder of the rebuttal fails to deflect from the points I had originally 
made. The points I concede in no way diminish the strength of my original conclusions and, 
indeed, the new information which has come to light during the Inquiry has reinforced them.  
In what follows I have modified my original conclusions in the light of the new information.  I do 
not intend to refer to the detailed written evidence which backs up my conclusions in this oral 
summary but am, of course, more than happy to explain the detail if anything is unclear. 
 
B. The conclusions I have drawn 
 
1. Firstly, given the amount of time and money that has been expended on preparation of 
the Business Case, there are a surprisingly large number of errors in the analysis (see for 
example NWLTF122 sections B12, B77, B78, B81, B83, B84 and C12). 
x Some are trivial, others are more serious. Some have been corrected, others 
have not.   
x Taken together, they must raise some doubts as to the standard of work 
undertaken. 
x Even more worryingly, there seems to be a tendency for the errors to have 
inflated the case for NGT  W suggesting a lack of balance in the scrutiny applied. 
  
2. My second conclusion is that the NGT scheme fails to meet key objectives: 
i. An important element of national transport policy (e.g. as embodied in the 2008 
Climate Change Act and in the national Door to Door strategy) is the 
achievement of reductions in CO2 and other GHG emissions. Reduced emission 
of CO2 and other GHGs is an objective of the WYLTP (LTP3 2011) and is a specific 
objective of the NGT scheme (#5 in para 2.6 of C-1-15). However, the LTM 
predicts that introduction of NGT would result in an increase in GHG emissions. 
ii. A long standing objective of national transport policy (endorsed in the 2010 
Coalition Agreement) which is specifically identified in the WYLTP, is to seek 
reductions in road casualties. However, the LTM predicts that introduction of 
NGT would result in an increase in accidents (C-1 para 15.85). 
iii. Increased use of sustainable modes is an objective of the national Door to Door 
strategy - which specifically refers ƚŽƚŚĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐŽĨƚƌĂǀĞůďǇƚŚĞ “ŚĞĂůƚŚŝĞƐƚ ?
modes, of the NPPF, of the Leeds Climate Change Strategy - Vision for Action ʹ 
which gives particular priority to the promotion of smarter choices including 
walking and cycling, and of the WYLTP. Also, the Department of Health has 
issued guidelines indicating the desirability of increased physical activity. 
However, the LTM predicts that introduction of NGT would result in reduced 
cycling and walking (see detailed figures in NWLTF122 Section C15). 
iv. An objective of WYLTP (LTP3) is to encourage economic growth by improving 
connectivity. Introduction of NGT would indeed provide lower in-vehicle journey 
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times for some journeys and, in a few cases, lower door-to-door journey times. 
However, based on LTM forecasts, it is clear that the broader picture is of 
reduced connectivity. Viz: 
x Average journey times by car - and by goods vehicles - would be higher. 
x Average door-to-door journey times would be longer for most journeys 
by bus in the NGT corridor and even for some journeys by trolleybus 
(see NWLTF122 sections C2 and C3)  
x Perceived journey times  W i.e. actual door to door times weighted to 
allow for the different values of time spent walking, waiting and 
standing - would be higher for many journeys by public transport (see 
NWLTF122 sections C3). 
x These reductions in connectivity will tend to depress, rather than 
generate, economic growth. 
x The desire for regeneration of specified sites is also a stated objective. 
However, NGT is very poorly aligned with most of the areas in need of 
regeneration. 
v. One of the broader objectives of the WYLTP is to improve the quality of life of 
people living in the region. This aspiration appears in the form of two very 
specific objectives of the NGT scheme (#6 and #7 in C-1-15 para 2.6). One is to 
improve the quality of life through (promotion of) a safe and healthy built and 
natural environment  and the other is to improve the quality of life by 
improving access for all to jobs and services. 
However, respecting promotion of a safe and healthy built and natural 
environment, we note that:  
x The LTM predicts that introduction of NGT would: 
 Increase congestion  
 Increase noise, fuel consumption, emissions and KSI (Killed or 
Seriously Injured) casualties 
 Reduce the use of active modes   
x The proposers accept that introduction of NGT would have an adverse 
effect on landscape, townscape  and heritage  
x There is a concern  - unexplored in the modelling - that local congestion 
caused by road closures and signalisation might increase local emissions 
x There is a risk - unexplored in the modelling - that parking restrictions, 
some of which appear unnecessary (see NWLTF122 Section C5), may lead 
customers to drive to more distant facilities. This, together with the 
disruption during construction and reduced quality of townscape, is likely 
to undermine the viability of local facilities. Their disappearance would 
constitute a deterioration in the quality of life for local residents and 
would tend to result in reduced walking and increased driving - thereby 
further increasing congestion and emissions. 
Respecting improvement in the quality of life by improving access for all to jobs 
and services, we note that:  
x the average journeys by car, and many journeys by public transport, 
would take longer if NGT were introduced.   
x NGT would only serve two corridors and does not provide a link to 
important facilities in and around the city  W e.g. many of the city centre 
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shopping areas, the bus station, the airport, St James Hospital, Elland 
ZŽĂĚĨŽŽƚďĂůůŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ? 
x Due to the greater distance between stops and limited availability of 
seating on tŚĞǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ?E'dǁŽƵůĚďĞůĞƐƐ “ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝďůĞ ?ƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝƚŚ
limited ability to walk or stand.  
 /ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚE'd ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨůŝĨĞůŽŽŬƐĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚůǇŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? 
vi. An objective of the WYLTP and a specific objective of the NGT scheme (#4 in para 
2.6 of C-1-15) is that the efficiency of the transport networks should be 
improved. However , LTM predicts that introduction of NGT would result in an 
increase in inputs - journey time and costs- to achieve a given level of output  W a 
fixed number of trips. This indicates a reduction in system efficiency. The 
increased inputs include: 
x Increased person hours spent travelling  W summed across all modes (see 
NWLTF122 section C9) 
x Increased time spent driving (Table 58 of C-1-8) 
x Increased fuel consumption (Table 17.12  mentions the increased fuel 
duty receipts) 
x Increased expenditure on fares (Table 17.12 of C-1 shows increased 
expenditure of £66m) 
x Increased public expenditure on transport infrastructure and services  
(Table 16.1 of C-1 shows grant and subsidy costs amounting to £532m)   
x I acknowledge (in Sections B129 and B130 of NWLTF122) that the 
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞtz>dWŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
from the systematic definition implied above but have demonstrated 
that, even judged by its own definition, NGT fails to deliver increased 
efficiency. 
vii. A widely quoted objective of the NGT scheme (e.g. para 1.7 of C-1) is that it 
would provide a step change improvement in the quality of public transport. 
However, although it would provide reduced in-vehicle time for those whose 
journeys are served by the trolleybuses, many aspects of the PT offer would be 
less attractive if NGT were introduced: 
x longer average walks to and from the stops.  On average, those who 
choose NGT would have to walk further because the stops would be 
more widely spaced and those who choose bus would have to walk 
further because some stops would no longer exist and others would be 
moved away from junctions. 
x increased stress and potential frustration due to the need to decide, in 
advance between bus and NGT  stops - frustration if the first vehicle 
ĂƌƌŝǀĞƐĂƚƚŚĞ “ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƚŽƉ. 
x less frequent services at any given stop and hence increased average 
waiting times - irrespective of whether people choose bus or NGT. 
x longer door-to-door journey times for those who choose bus  W including 
all those whose journey passes along the NGT route but is not served by 
it (see journey time calculations in NWLTF122 section C2)  
x a reduced chance of getting a seat and an increased risk of having to 
stand in crowded condition  - for those who choose NGT 
x a higher fare for the shortest trips -for those who choose NGT 
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viii. Policy T1(v) of the Unitary Development Plan (See NWLTF SoC appendix E.06d) 
referred to the intention to  ?ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚravel modes 
through better interchange between and within modes ?ĂŶĚĂ widely quoted 
objective of NGT (see for example para 3.7 of C-1 or the NGT website 
http://www.ngtmetro.com/about/ ) is that it would form part of an integrated 
transport system. I accept that, in line with this aspiration, the southbound NGT 
stop would be closer to the rail station than is the existing #1 bus stop but point 
out that: 
x The northbound NGT stop would be further from the station than is the 
existing #1 bus stop on Bishopgate.  
x NGT does not serve the bus station whereas the #6 bus does. 
x The provision of separate NGT stops bus stops would make interchange 
with bus services less convenient than it now is (see NWLTF122 section 
B114.2)  
x The provision of separate NGT stops bus stops, the use of a different fare 
structure and the separate branding of NGT would result in NGT being 
perceived as a separate service rather than a fully integrated part of the 
bus network. 
x This separation would be further re-enforced if some of the tickets 
accepted on buses were not accepted on NGT  W or vice-versa.  
x (See sections B113-114 of NWLTF122 for further detail).  
ix. One of the aspirations of the Leeds Vision (C-1-15 para 2.23) is to minimise the 
growth in car use and NGT has been widely presented as offering an attractive 
alternative to the car (see for example para 6.7 of C-1-15 or the NGT website 
http://www.ngtmetro.com/about/). However, the LTM forecasts (explored in 
NWLTF122 Section C15) indicate that introduction of NGT would lead to:  
x Increased car use - measured as car miles  
x Minimal reduction in the number of car trips  W the reduction is less than 
that in the number of trips by active modes, and 
x a very much larger reduction  in the number of trips by bus and rail.  
x. The Leeds Vision (quoted in C-1-15 para 2.24), in line with Webtag guidance on 
policy formation, seeks to make best use of existing transport assets. However, 
the promoters accept that the NGT scheme would result in: 
x Fewer bus services linking to the bus station 
x Fewer buses stopping at existing bus stops  
x Reduced use of existing bus services 
x Reduced use of existing rail services. 
xi. No transport scheme can be expected to meet all the relevant objectives but 
E'd ?ƐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽŵĞĞƚƐŽŵĂŶǇŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐŝƐƋƵŝƚĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞ ? 
 
3. My third conclusion is that the usage of - and revenue from - NGT services has been 
seriously over-estimated. This over-estimation is due to exaggerated penalties on bus 
and train journeys, the failure to allow for the effect of crowding on NGT vehicles, the 
use of a unjustified adjustments in the P&R model and some peculiarities in the 
predictions of journey times. I will deal with each of these in turn. 
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i. The exaggerated Vehicle Quality Penalty applied to bus and rail (5.5 minutes) 
which boosts the prediction of trolleybus use because no VQP applied to 
trolleybus ?/ŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞWƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚ P  
x ignored the result from SP  - which was that there is no significant 
preference for trolleybus and actually a negative preference - and that 
his stated reason for so doing is invalid (NWLTF122 section B21).  
x used the preference for verynewbus over oldbus as a proxy for the 
preference for trolleybus to which the Promoters aspire. This cannot be 
justified (NWLTF122 section B21). 
ii. The failure to allow for the effect on passengers of crowding and of limited 
access to seating which will characterise journeys by NGT (NWLTF122 section 
C7). The consultant decided to ignore this issue despite the fact that:  
x Webtag indicates the importance of this issue and recommends applying 
penalty equivalent to 50% of journey time (NWLTF122 section C8), and 
that 
x other studies find lack of seating to be the single most important quality 
issue (NWLTF122 section C8 para 2). 
x (NWLTF122 section D2 provides a fuller discussion of this important 
issue) 
iii. The exaggerated penalty used to represent the absence of desirable features at 
boarding points 
x Average values are 7.1 for bus, 9.4 for rail, 1.3 for NGT  
x Leeds SP gave much higher values than other research  - For example the 
values based on AECOM ?Ɛ research for DfT (NWLTF122 section C6) 
x dŚĞ>ĞĞĚƐ^W ?ƐĞxaggerated values of shelter, CCTV and lighting are 
probably due to the time of year that the survey was conducted and the 
high profile security concerns at that time (NWLTF122 section B28) 
x The poor lighting value should not have been applied to daylight 
journeys (NWLTF122 section B26). 
x The rail value is too high  W even judged by the values derived from the 
Leeds SP (NWLTF122 section C12) 
iv. The excessive size of the overall penalty  - the vehicle quality penalty and stop 
penalty combined 
x A net penalty of 11.3 minutes for bus and 13.6 minutes for rail is applied 
in the LTM  
 These penalties are greater than the in-vehicle journey time for 
some journeys! 
 They are largely responsible for the predicted shift from bus and 
rail to trolleybus 
 They are thus ƚŚĞŬĞǇĚƌŝǀĞƌĨŽƌƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚƌĞǀĞŶƵĞƐĂŶĚ “ũŽƵƌŶĞǇ
ƚŝŵĞďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ? 
 Their impact may be illustrated by considering that they will 
mean that someone living midway between Horsforth Rail 
station and Holt Park and wanting to travel to City Square would 
be predicted to use the trolleybus rather than the train even if 
the journey took 13 ½ minutes longer by trolleybus than it would 
by train. 
8 
 
x I would agree with Mr Cheek that an overall value of 5.5 minutes might 
be justified if one were comparing a 2008 bus picking up at an ill-
equipped bus stop to the most modern vehicle picking up at a well-
equipped stop, but I do not think 5.5 minutes - still less 11.3 or 13.6 
minutes - is justified if passengers on the new vehicle have to anticipate 
standing - sometimes in very crowded conditions. 
x I do not think that penalties of 11.3 minutes for bus, or 13.6 minutes for 
rail, are remotely reasonable in the context of the proposed trolleybus 
scheme. The argument made to DfT (and repeated in C-2-4) that these 
penalties are reasonable is very misleading (see NWLTF122 section C6). 
x The penalties were derived from SP surveys but have not been scaled 
down to overcome well-known tendency of SP to exaggerate willingness 
to pay to use new modes (see NWLTF122 section B27). 
x I do not think that it is remotely reasonable to assume that any initial 
superiority in trolleybus ride quality would not in due course be achieved 
by new buses - LTM assumes that the differential continues 
undiminished for 60 years. (NWLTF122 section B32). 
x If these penalty factors were replaced by more realistic values, the 
revenue stream and benefits would reduce dramatically and the business 
case would fail completely.  
v. The large negative alternative-specific constants in the park and ride model (see 
NWLTF122 section B35) 
x Taking approximately 70 minutes taken off the  “cost ? of park and ride 
trips will have increased the predicted demand for P&R very markedly -
the reduction in generalised time will reduce the total generalised time 
for an average trip to a fraction of its unadjusted level. 
x The impact of the ASC can be illustrated by considering someone who is 
choosing whether to park in the city centre or use the P&R site; the 
model will predict use of the P&R site even if the P&R option involved an 
extra hour of travel time.  
x The ASCs were apparently used because the P&R model had needed 
adjustments of this magnitude in order to replicate demand for rail-
based P&R at Garforth and New Pudsey - but there is no reason to 
assume that similar adjustment is appropriate for the trolleybus-based 
P&R at Bodington and Stourton (NWLTF122 section B35 ii). 
vi. The over-oƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨE'd ?ƐũŽƵƌŶĞǇƚŝŵĞ. No allowance being made 
for: 
x delay to NGT vehicles when behind a bus (OBJ1719-3 para A1 iv and v)  
x degraded priority for NGT vehicles when there are more than 10 vehicles 
per hour (NWLTF122 last sentence of Section B6) 
x the lower NGT speeds achievable in the shared space outside Leeds 
University and in the narrow lanes shared with cyclists (NWLTF122 
section B4). 
vii. Against this background, I conclude that the patronage and revenue forecasts are 
very seriously exaggerated. 
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4. My fourth conclusion is that a number of important impacts of NGT are not known. I will 
highlight the main ones. 
i. The impact on traffic flows and delays on local links is not known. Although 
Webtag expects a good fit between observed and predicted flows in the Area of 
Detailed Modelling  (see NWLTF122 D1d), the LTM has not been able to replicate 
local flows accurately  (NWLTF122 section C14). This is probably associated with  
the fact that >dD ?ƐŶetwork and zoning in the Area of Detailed Modelling do not 
meet Webtag requirements (see NWLTF122 Section D1): 
x The zones are too large and centroid connectors are incorrectly placed, 
with resultant distortion of local flow patterns (NWLTF122 Sections D1a 
and B12) 
x Some links are missing. This makes it impossible to predict impacts on 
those links or on other links and junctions in the vicinity (NWLTF122 
Section D1b) 
x There appear to be errors in the coding of the critical junction at Shaw 
lane (NWLTF122 section C11) 
x The sophistication of the TRANSYT models is not reflected in the strategic 
LTM (see, for example, NWLTF122 section B10). For example: 
 The failure of LTM to allow for reduced capacity which would 
result from use of STM to avoid blocking-back  
 The SATURN network is insufficiently detailed to pick up locally-
important effects - e.g.  “q ?ƚƵƌŶƐŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞĚďǇďĂŶŶĞĚ
movements, and potential loss of A660 capacity due to removal 
of right turn pockets. 
 The large zone sizes prevented detailed examination of fit 
between the TRANSYT and SATURN models 
 The consistency check which was employed will not have 
detected problems only apparent on the side roads. 
ii. The impact on cycling and walking is not known. There is no proper model of 
active modes and so it is not possible to estimate the net effect on active mode 
use with any degree of certainty (NWLTF122 section D1c). 
iii. The demand for Bodington and Stourton P &R sites is not known with any degree 
of certainty. Mr Hanson volunteered that the model forecasts had an error of 
plus or minus 50% but I conclude that the error is likely to be even larger than 
that because:  
x Use of such large ASCs is a clear indication that the model had failed to 
capture the factors explaining demand for, or aversion to, P&R services 
(this is admitted in C-1-3 at the bottom of page 43). 
x The LTM has predicted usage by drivers who would have to drive out to 
the P&R sites before catching the trolley back in again, but has not 
predicted usage from the more obvious catchments - e.g. Wakefield for 
Stourton (NWLTF122 Section B39). 
iv. The impact of NGT on the Leeds economy not known.  
x The UDM forecasts are flawed (NWLTF122 second paragraph of section 
B41)  W if the model were to be run with more realistic generalised costs it 
might well show that NGT would lead to a loss of jobs in the city.  
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x The impact of parking restrictions and degradation of townscape on the 
viability of local businesses is not known  W it is one of the potentially 
important impacts which are not easily modelled.  
v. The robustness of the forecasts, most particularly of NGT patronage and 
revenue, is unknown due to the failure to conduct meaningful sensitivity 
analysis, despite very clear Webtag guidance on this issue (e.g. in E-3-24, Section 
1.8 of E-3-12 and Section 3.4 of E-3-22). Particular aspects which should have 
been subject to systematic sensitivity analysis include: 
x dŚĞƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƚƌŽůůĞǇďƵƐŽǀĞƌďƵƐĂŶĚƌĂŝů 
x The ƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?ĂƐƐƵŵĞĚůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂďŽƵƚůĂĐŬŽĨƐĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŽĨ
sometimes having to stand in crowded conditions  - the test mentioned 
ŝŶƚŚĞWƌŽŵŽƚĞƌƐ ?ƌĞďƵƚƚĂůŽĨŵǇWƌŽŽĨǁĂƐŶŽƚĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƚĞƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
the value placed on lack of seating /crowding was clearly too low (see 
NWLTF122 Section C8 )  
x dŚĞƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌƐ ?Ăssumed, but unexplained, preference for park and ride 
 W inherent in use of high ASCs in LTM. 
x The assumed ability of NGT to achieve much faster boarding times than 
could be achieved by conventional buses.  
x The assumed absence of serious and sustained competition from bus 
operators (see NWLTF122 Section B33). 
x The potential impact of city centre parking policy on demand for P&R 
(Webtag advice in para 3.4.10 of E-3-22 makes a particular point of 
mentioning the need to explore the impact of parking policy via 
sensitivity testing). 
 
5.  My fifth conclusion is that E'd ?Ɛďenefits are exaggerated because the performance of 
the Do Minimum comparator is under-estimated because no allowance is made for: 
i. Increases in the perceived quality of bus vehicles beyond that pertaining in 2008 
- at any stage in the 60 year life of the NGT project - despite clear trends in 
vehicle quality within the bus industry 
ii. Improvements in bus boarding times  W despite clear trends in the industry 
respecting cashless fares, smart ticketing and contactless ticket readers (see 
NWLTF122 section B58) 
iii. Readily achievable improvements in bus priority at various points along the A660 
(see NWLTF122 section B59) 
iv. Potential improvements in junction performance achieved by optimisation of 
signals (see OBJ-1719 section A18 i and NWLTF122 section B60).  
 
6. My sixth conclusion is that alternatives to NGT have not been properly assessed. 
i. The Next Best Alternative is not a real alternative because, since it differs from 
the PA only in respect of the power source, it shares many of the W^ ?ƐĚƌĂǁďĂĐŬƐ 
- provision of separate stops, limited number of priority vehicles per hour hence 
lower frequency, deleterious impact on bus services, high capital cost. Its impact 
on landscape, townscape and heritage is reduced, due to the absence of OHLE 
but is still significant.  
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ii. The Low Cost Alternative scheme is not a serious attempt to show what could be 
achieved at lower cost. 
x Mr Chadwick admitted this; he said that the LCA was developed simply 
to justify the application for funding of the major investment.  
x Much more could be achieved in respect of: 
 Vehicle quality - the LCA assumes no perceived improvement on 
2008 vehicles.  
 Bus stop facilities - the LCA includes very modest improvement 
despite the fact that improvements in bus stop facilities are 
known to be very cost effective (see NWLTF122 section B102)  
 Reduced boarding times - and hence improvements in journey 
times and punctuality;  the LCA assumes no improvement over 
the situation pertaining in 2012 despite the clear potential 
offered by a combination of vehicle design and ticketing and of 
fare structures designed to accelerate the move to cashless fares 
(see NWLTF122 sections B33 and B100). 
 Bus priority - the priority included in the specification of the LCA 
is represented as singularly ineffective (see NWLTF122 Sections 
B60 and C4)  
 Bus routing; e.g. provision, if justified, of more limited-stop 
services or of more cross-city links. 
x Promoters were not following Webtag advice respecting generation of 
alternatives (see NWLTF122 Section D5 for more detail): 
 Attention has been focused on one solution - NGT - seemingly 
because it was thought similar to Supertram and would be the 
most prestigious project eligible for funding. 
 The A660 corridor seems to have been chosen because it was 
thought likely to generate the best revenue not because it needs 
NGT 
 The Trolleybus technology seems to have been chosen because it 
allows use of a TWAO procedure - which in turn seems to have 
been the preferred procedure because it offers the Promoters 
control over operations of the implemented system.  
 There has never been a detailed examination of alternative 
means of meeting the transport needs of North West Leeds - in 
particular, of interventions which could yield significant 
improvements for all users of public transport much more 
quickly and at much lower ongoing cost to the public purse. 
 Users ? views on the transport needs in the A660/A61 corridors 
have not been sought. The results of the Leeds-wide survey in 
November 2008 cannot be said to justify the introduction of a 
separate public transport service whose particular advantage is 
reduced in-vehicle time (as noted by Mr Kemp). 
 
7. My seventh conclusion is that, despite Webtag and Green Book emphasis on the need for 
transparency and even-handedness in the reporting of results, the presentation of the 
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Business Case is misleading. This issue is discussed in greater length in Section D3 of 
NWLTF122 but is summarised as follows: 
i. Mode use  (see NWLTF122 Section C15 for detailed figures) 
x Text in Table 6.1 in C-1 suggests there would be a switch from car use 
but the LTM actually predicts an increase in car miles.  (Measured in trip 
numbers, car trips are indeed predicted to decrease but less so than 
active mode trips). 
x Text in Table 17.12 of C-1 suggests that there would be a beneficial 
impact on physical activity but the LTM prediction is for a reduction in 
use of active modes. 
ii. Safety (respecting the WYLTP target to reduce KSI accidents) 
x The commentary in Table 7.3 of C-1 suggests, without any evidence, that 
pedestrian and cyclist casualties will fall but fails to mention that, using 
the accepted calculation methodology, NGT is predicted to result in an 
increase in road casualties. 
iii. Emissions  
x Table 7.2 in C-1 claims a GHG reduction worth £6.2m (corrected in Table 
B1 of APP-7-3  to an increase of £3.1m)  
x The commentary in Table 7.3 of C-1, discussing the WYLTP objective to 
reduce CO2 emissions, suggests that NGT would make a positive 
contribution towards this target  W despite the predicted increase in GHG 
emissions. 
iv. Connectivity and Access  
x Tables 6.1, 7.1, 7.2 and 17.12 in C-1 variously claim improvements in 
connectivity and access and mention reduced journey time and new 
cross city services.  
x However, despite Webtag ?s advice on the measurement of accessibility 
and connectivity - which refers to the need to consider all elements of 
door-to-door journeys rather than simply the in-vehicle journey time 
element of one mode, there is no mention of the fact that: 
 Journeys by car would, on average, take longer. 
 Journeys by bus would generally take longer (NWLTF122 Section 
C2) 
 The northern extremities of bus routes #1 and #6, whose 
frequency is assumed to be cut by about half, would not be 
served by NGT - nor would the northern extremities of bus 
routes #28 and #97 whose frequency is must also be expected to 
fall.  
 NGT would provide access to or from a very small part of the 
Leeds conurbation, would not serve many of the key destinations 
in the city centre  W e.g. The DĞƌƌŝŽŶĞŶƚƌĞ ?^ƚ:ŽŚŶ ?ƐĞŶƚƌĞ ?
Grand Theatre, Victoria Gate, Leeds Market, the Bus Station - 
and, as revealed during the cross-examination of Mr Farrington, 
would not penetrate the main areas identified for regeneration. 
 ůĚĞƌůǇŽƌŝŶĨŝƌŵƚƌĂǀĞůůĞƌƐ ?ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞ
particularly adversely affected by the longer average walk to 
public transport boarding points - due to greater distance 
between NGT stops and the relocation/deletion  of bus stops, 
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the longer average waiting times -due to reduced frequency at 
any given stop, and the reduced likelihood of getting a seat. 
x (See Section A8 of OBJ1719-3 and Section B40 of NWLTF122 for further 
detail on access and connectivity impacts). 
v. Journey time savings  
x £701m of public transport passenger journey time benefits are claimed 
in Table7.2 of C-1. However, about 50% (possibly more - see NWLTF122 
Section C1) of the claimed reduction is actually the assumed reduction in 
quality penalties rather than a real reduction in journey times. This fact 
was acknowledged by Mr Chadwick during cross-examination but is not 
mentioned anywhere in the Business Case and indeed, Table 17.4 of C1 
goes so far as to suggest that the journey quality benefits have not even 
been monetised!  
In actual fact the LTM predicts that the introduction of NGT would result 
in an increase in total journey time  W summed over all modes (NWLTF122 
Section C9) 
vi. Efficiency (see NWLTF section B129 and B130): 
x Table 7.2 of C-1 mentions £701m of public transport passenger journey 
time saving - much of which is actually the assumed increase in quality 
factors, together with revenue (!) and punctuality benefits 
x but omits: 
 the increased congestion (which can be seen from Table 17.1 of 
C-1 to cost £12m),  
 the overall increase  in time spent travelling  - summed over all 
modes, and 
 the increased fuel consumption. 
vii. Employment.  Section 13.80 of C-1 claims 3687 new jobs would be generated as 
a result of NGT. TŚŝƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĐŽŵĞƐĨƌŽŵ^' ?ƐhƌďĂŶǇŶĂŵŝĐDŽĚĞů ? But 
this prediction is extremely dubious because it ignored the increases in highway 
costs and times and treated the assumed increase in quality factors, which I have 
shown to be wholly unjustified, as if they were real time savings (the Promoters 
ŚĂǀĞĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŽŶůǇĂďŽƵƚ ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞ “ƚŝŵĞƐĂǀŝŶŐƐ ?ĂƌĞƌĞĂůƚŝŵĞƐĂǀŝŶŐƐ ? ? 
viii. Service Reliability.  Table17.4 in C-1 identifies a benefit of £84m from improved 
reliability. This result is quoted several times in the Business Case but is an 
exaggerated estimate because: 
x It does not allow for the fact that the difference between journey times 
in and out of term time is allowed for by most travellers (see NWLTF122 
section B67) 
x It is based on stop-to-stop variation and so ignores the relatively 
invariant walk element (see NWLTF122 section B69). 
x It does not allow for the possible reduction in bus punctuality due to 
removal of the current signal priority for late-running buses noted by Mr 
Robertson during cross-examination (see NWLTF122 section B70). 
ix. The calculated BCR, quoted in Table 17.4 of C-1 as 2.96 although subsequently 
corrected to 2.90, excludes: 
x Cost of disruption during construction  W despite clear Webtag guidance 
(see NWLTF122 section B56)  
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x Cost attributable to the predicted reduction in active mode use (see 
NWLTF122 section C17) 
x. The adjusted BCR  W which includes the  “ǁŝĚĞƌďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨdĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ
accept within the basic BCR - is quoted in Table 17.10 of C-1 as 3.72. This value is 
misleading because: 
x It includes benefit from the forecast increase in employment and 
reliability - both of which I challenge. 
x It excludes the cost of degraded landscape  - which DfT guidance now 
includes within the adjusted BCR and which might exceed £100m 
(Section C16 of NWLTF122) 
 
8. Finally, I conclude that there must be doubts over achievability of funding (See 
NWLTF122 section D6) 
i.  It is unreasonable to expect DfT to be unperturbed by revelations on:   
x Quality Factors  W viz: the actual result on willingness to pay to travel on 
Trolleybuses, Leeds being out of line in respect of the assumed size of 
quality factors, penalties being applied to rail, no scaling of SP-derived 
penalties.  
x Increased cost to public sector  W required grants and subsidies have 
Increased from £290m in the 2012 PEBC to £532m in the 2014 BC.   
x Increased cost to Transport Budget  -  The loss in rail franchise value was 
£21m in the 2012 PEBC but has risen to £38m in the 2014 BC. 
x >dD ?ƐĨailure to replicate local flows 
x UDM ?Ɛ predictions being based on PT journey times and the 
controversial quality factors without any account being taken of 
increases in highway costs/times 
x Negative impacts on the PT offer  W viz: crowding, longer journey time for 
ŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? ? 
x (See NWLTF122 section D4  for more detail on this point) 
ii. The projected revenue stream cannot be regarded as robust (D6c) 
iii. Local political support is necessary to secure the local funding (D6b), but: 
x Several key individuals have already withdrawn their support. 
x There is no apparent awareness among key local politicians of 
weaknesses in the Business Case and, most particularly, of the fragility of 
the projected revenue stream. 
x Despite claims by the promoters, public opposition to NGT is clear and is 
likely to increase further once key weaknesses in the business case 
become more widely known.  
 
9. Overall, I can only conclude that the business case for NGT is weak, flawed and misleading 
and that the supposed benefits have been grossly exaggerated. 
My considered conclusion is that the deficiencies in the proposed scheme are 
fundamental rather than cosmetic; the corridor simply does not have the space to 
accommodate a new, separate and distinct mode of public transport which is prioritised 
over all other modes but, in attempting to do so, the scheme causes significant damage to 
the existing public transport offer as well as to ƚŚĞĂƌĞĂ ?ƐĂŵďŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
assets. 
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The proposed allocation of priority and roadspace is fundamentally inefficient; rather 
than give absolute priority to up to ten public transport vehicles per hour, a much better 
approach would be to give significant priority to all buses and to users of active modes. 
 
I have concluded that the decision to introduce a trolleybus scheme was ill-considered 
and precipitous in the wake of the refusal of funding for Supertram. I believe that decision 
makers were blinded by the prospect of DfT funding for something similar to Supertram 
and of being able to adapt much of the modelling and design work which had been 
conducted for that scheme. Interestingly, the dangers of too rapid a commitment to a 
trolleybus-based approach were identified in the 2007 Gateway review (C.4.7). One of the 
consequences of the early attachment to a trolleybus approach has been that progress on 
consideration, let alone implementation, of the solutions identified in the 2006 review of 
problems (G-4-5) has been delayed - Mr Haskins indicated during my cross questionning  
(8th May, 11 minutes into early pm session) that the lack of action on the measures 
identified in G-4-5 was due to the decision to proceed with NGT proposal.  The sooner the 
NGT scheme is finally put out of contention the sooner attention can be turned to 
implementation of better alternatives. 
 
